The two posts in which I have held the city’s and the gas company’s feet to the fire for the way they handled (or didn’t) the JJ’s disaster last week have generated many comments and lots of interest.
A key person who just weighed in today, with two lengthy comments on the first post, was Mark McDonald, president of the North American Gas Workers Association.
Some of you will recall it was McDonald who told The Star:
“It should have taken three minutes (to shut off gas to the area), and the building wouldn’t have exploded.”
With those few words, McDonald voiced the frustration that thousands of Kansas Citians were feeling about Missouri Gas Energy’s response to the situation, as well as the failure of the gas company and the Kansas City Fire Department to evacuate people from the area before the blast.
People reported that a strong smell of gas permeated the area for an hour before the explosion, which killed one person, waitress Megan Cramer, and injured 15.
Mark McDonald, checking for gas leaks in Boston
In today’s comments (which you can see in their entirety at the bottom of my Feb. 21 post), McDonald responded to another commenter’s call for him to elaborate on his original statement. He also responded to a commenter who accused me of playing “the blame game.”
Below, I have culled what I consider the most interesting and pertinent quotes from his two comments.
:: Regarding the commenter’s call for elaboration on shutting off gas valves…
I agree with your points about my statement being somewhat confusing to the lay person/public…I explained in length (to the reporter) and extensively about what should be available to shut down a gas leak of this magnitude…The reporters-editors decide what to write, and to what extent they decide makes enough sense to the average reader. Space in the newspaper is (at) a premium.
I will elaborate here…The gas could have been turned off at what’s known as a “critical valve” or primary valve. These are required to be in place and inspected annually under state and federal regulations to ensure they are accessible…to prevent such a disaster at JJ’s.
My understanding is the crew decided to dig a vent hole to help the gas vent into the air, instead of shutting down the critical valve. After the explosion, it appears the company had to dig out one valve at one end of the street and dig down to the main and crimp off the other end.
I hope that helps a bit. I also must point out that my comments are based on industry standards and requirements/regulations and what information I can confirm from the incident itself. I am not on-site or involved in the direct investigation, but I believe my comments were accurate in this case.
Keep in mind, when something like this happens, the media is full of questions without many answers. When asked, I try to educate the reporter on the technical basics of natural gas and what I believe are the possibilities, based on dozens of other gas explosions around the nation.
My overall goal is to ensure that information that is as accurate as possible gets out to the public — sooner than a year or so from now…when the PSC (Missouri Public Service Commission) releases its final report of its findings.
Questions need to be asked and answered soon after the explosion. The public and the loved ones of those lost and injured deserve at least that.
***
:: Regarding another commenter’s assertion about “the blame game” and the location of shut-off valves…
If you read the state and federal regulations, it does state the location of such valves shall be positioned for a shutdown in case of an emergency, and it also states the “pressure” is one of the things to be considered when spacing these valves.
If it (the shut-off valve) is blocks away from the leak…it sounds like the company may not have placed the valve correctly in terms of safely shutting down a high pressure system.
The other factor here is (that) “main” valves used (to) be located at the end of each street (or every few blocks on longer streets)…and maintained. In my opinion, since de-regulation the gas companies have reduced their staffing by over 20 percent, while gas customers have grown by more than 20 percent.
The companies looking to cut back on costs could not maintain the main valves, nor were they directly required to by regulation. So, they were often paved over and not installed in newer installations.
Placing hundreds or even thousands of customers on one “critical/primary” valve is quite dangerous…The PSC (Public Service Commission) does take an extra step on the federal regulation requiring critical valves (to) be spaced so that a shutdown can be re-lit within eight hours.
Based on this incident and some comments here, it (the PSC) needs to go much further, especially on high-pressure gas, since it sounds like the company can’t control their own gas when it leaks.
***
Many thanks to Mark McDonald for elaborating on his understanding of the situation at JJ’s.
Everything he has said, as well as a strong feeling in my gut, has convinced me that the JJ’s explosion could have been avoided and that, at the very least, the area should have been evacuated.
If JJ’s would had exploded without any injuries or loss of life, most of us would have said, “That was a big fire.” Few people, except maybe Jimmy and David Frantze, would have questioned so strongly what responders were doing during the hour before that horrible explosion.
Another great post Jim, love your independent source. Keep it coming! Sounds like the BP disaster in the gulf, another example of profits trumping safety and the regulatory watchdogs asleep or distracted by industry $.
Editor’s note: This comment was meant to be in response to Jim Gottsch’s second comment, which you will find below. The misplacement is due to the fact that this comment didn’t get published until I approved it. (That’s a prerequisite with first-time commenters.)
Money is always a factor when corporations increase profits by reducing investment in critical safety systems.
Properly training personnel, installing critical safety equipment (such as shutoff valves), having the personnel present to PROPERLY RESPOND TO EMERGENCIES in a timely fashion, and maintenance and testing of existing safety systems; all are cost centers, not profit centers.
MBA’s and other management personnel get raises and promotions by cutting costs until something bad happens.
Looking at the recent corporate history, it is not out of line to speculate that there have been a number of recent rounds of whatever the buzz phrase is for ‘reducing the excessive safety and increasing profits.’
* “In 1925, Mr. Doherty consolidated his natural gas distribution businesses in these four states into The Gas Service Company… The Gas Service Company served Kansas City and over 250 other communities throughout Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska and Oklahoma until 1983.
That year, Kansas Power and Light Company (KPL) bought The Gas Service Company. This marked the first of several successive changes in ownership. In 1992, KPL merged with the Kansas Gas & Electric company to become Western Resources (now known as Westar Energy). In 1994, Western Resources sold its Missouri natural gas assets to the Southern Union Company, a pipeline company headquartered in Houston. Southern Union began operating this newly formed division as Missouri Gas Energy. In 2012, Southern Union, along with Missouri Gas Energy, was sold to Energy Transfer Equity, a diversified natural gas and natural gas liquids pipeline company headquartered in Dallas. In late 2012, the Laclede Group, parent company to Laclede Gas in St. Louis, Mo., announced its intent to purchase MGE and New England Gas from ETE. The deal is expected to be finalized by the third quarter of 2013.
The final reports will help explain what happened. MBAs and the corporate culture they have produced are how it happened.
* Italicized section courtesy of Wikipedia.
I don’t think money was a factor here, Jim, just gas guys and fire fighters not taking basic precautionary measures. I still have a big problem with the fire fighters standing down. As one City Council member told me today, “They’ve got the badge.”
You’re right Jim, money was not a direct factor. It was, however, likely the reason the gas system was so poorly designed and maintained that the desperate MGE workers could not just shut the gas off. Mark McDonald made that much clear. No conspiracy here, just a chain of disastrously sloppy,bad choices and decisions. The tragic outcome could have been averted at many points but wasn’t. Like a Coen Brother’s movie, only people died.
Sorry.
My comment above was meant to be here.
After reading “MBA’s” comment, I am changing my tune about money not being a factor. Looking at the big picture that “MBA’s” painted, it’s easy to see how obsession with maximizing profits could lead to a situation like the one at JJ’s.
Jim,
Again, you are right on the money. The Kansas City, MO, Fire Department has jurisdiction over every aspect in this type of situation. Between MG&E and the KCFD, the main should have been closed. The contractors should not have speculated or hesitated. They should have contacted MGE. MGE and the KCFD should have evacuated immediately and got to the working valve and closed it. Safety first!
The PSC can alter their regulation, but it does not change the obvious actions needed to avert this tragedy.
This is not “blame games,” it is documented operating procedures.
The digging often is guesswork. A valve turned from open to closed is certain safety.
Your expertise on underground cables and lines is very valuable in this discussion, Larry. It’s good to have professional voices buttressing others’ intuition and gut feelings.
i have never heard of the fire department deferring to other utilities, not even kcpl. besides, the fire dept has those big fans to help air out the bldg. i agree that the fire department should have ordered an evacuation. i heard that the (first) fire company left the scene. dont know if that is true, but if it is, i would have to say the fire dept screwed up big time.
Brilliant, Fitz. You’re doing the Lord’s work, and The Star’s. Heads need to roll. This was an epic failure by “trained professionals” to do the most basic thing their jobs require — work safely and protect lives. With each passing day, this p!sses me off more and more. We need names and addresses of the guilty. Who were the KCFD that “stood down”? Who was the MGE employee that said “no problem”? Who was the ditch digger? They all need to be tried and convicted in the court of public opinion. We can’t let this get swept under the rug the way the Mayor, KCFD and MGE want it to.
Editor’s note: This comment should fall beneath Mark’s 12:39 p.m. comment. I can’t explain why it landed here. Sorry.
Sadly, this happens all too often. It’s something I have been laboring for years to change! This is why it’s important to educate folks who will ask questions and demand change before it’s their loved ones lost because the gas company doesn’t want to spend the money to maintain more control of their system.
The following except is from a deadly explosion in Hopkinton, MA. A home exploded killing two little sisters Iris & Violet. The cause of the explosion has still not been “officially” determined. But (it is) widely suspected the company failed to maintain a very corroded inside gas line that finally collapsed inside the home.
The service valve was not accessible as the house landed on top of where the valve should be (although this same company estimated 72% of their service valves were inaccessible a couple years later).They went to main valves and the mockery of control is listed below.
These poor parents had to stand by for HOURS before the emergency responders could retrieve one of the girls’ bodies from the rubble because the gas company could not control the leaking gas to the home!
Incident Report
65 Main Street, Hopkinton (July 24, 2002) Page 19-20
In an annual letter to all operators, the Director of the Pipeline Engineering and Safety Division requests that operators inform the Department of any incident promptly, but no more than two hours after discovery of an incident.
H. Distribution Line Valves
Two NSTAR personnel arrived at 65 Main Street, Hopkinton at 2:12 a.m. on July 24, 2002, 22 minutes after the NSTAR Dispatcher received notice of the incident (Exh. 5).
At 3:10 a.m., the two NSTAR personnel were trying to locate the curb valve to shut off the gas flowing into the wreckage of the house, where it was known that one deceased victim still lay (Exh. 25).
The curb valve lay under the house wreckage, and NSTAR could not gain access to it to shut off the flow of gas to the house (id.).
At 3:30 a.m., a distribution crew arrived at the scene and began to excavate with the intent to squeeze off the main and to locate the distribution valves needed to shut down gas flow to the system near the collapsed house (id.).
At 4:03 a.m., the NSTAR Distribution Manager arrived at the site with the maps indicating the locations of the valves needed to isolate the system (Exh. 5).
At 4:09, an NSTAR supervisor was informed of the valve locations and prepared to shut down the valves on the main to isolate the system (id.).
At 4:28 a.m., the Distribution Manager notified the Department of the incident (id.).20
At 4:34 a.m., an NSTAR supervisor reported that he was unable to shut off one of the essential distribution line valves necessary to isolate the area (Exh. 25). This specific valve was located at the intersection of Hayden Rowe Street and Main Street (id.).
The valve box was not centered over the valve, denying access to NSTAR (id.). NSTAR’s map indicates that at least six distribution valves would have to be closed to isolate 65 Main Street (Exh. 26). Going from west to east along Main Street, it took 3 hours & 17 minutes to shut the gas down after the explosion, while the dead girl’s body lay waiting to be removed and returned to her family!
BTW, the gas company was NOT cited for a violation of the emergency shutoff regulation by the state or the federal regulators….Think that will lead to any changes?
I must demur, Smartman…Brilliant I ain’t or I would have risen more than one notch on the ladder during 36-plus years at The Star.
As a friend told me, “You said what a lot of people are thinking.” Then, today, I got lucky in that Mark McDonald somehow became aware of the posts and decided to respond.
Reportorial instinct and luck, Smartman, that’s what I’ve got going for me.
Thanks for all your comments. It’s great to have passionate readers like you!
I gotta go with smarty on this one Fitz.
Brilliant work.
Almost ALL of the questions I had, concerning valves, hierarchy of responsibility etc etc are starting to get fleshed out here on this blog.
Nice job.
I am still a little confused about the “Main Valve” access and the differing regulations concerning shutting them down (Some of the urls I looked up, said NEVER shut them down.) .
Anyway, again, nice job!
Maybe Mark will help flesh that out…In case he has not seen it, I’ll send your comment along…Thanks for the compliment, Chuck; I’m sure glad I weighed in on this. Good for the blog, good for the public.
Hi Chuck….Hope I can clear this up…
There are 2 types of “Main Valves”.
1: The regular main valves placed at intersections where sections of main cross and/or extend as a way of locally controlling the gas. Sadly, there is no federal regulation requiring these valves be in place, nor accessible. Few states have additional mandates on regular main valves.
2: The other type of “Main Valve” is known as a ‘Critical” or “Primary” valve that are regulated by both federal & your state’s PSC. These valves are required to be inspected annually to ensure they are clean, accessible and functional to ensure availability in case of an emergency.
The latter valve is what I referenced in my earlier postings. While this valve is mandated, the federal regulators do not require specific placement or the maximum amount of customers (which could be 5 or 5,000!). However, it does dictate certain factors must be addressed in placement of these valves. Such as: Pressure – Size of Main – Local Physical Conditions (such as a downtown area) – Time to Shut Down in Emergency.
Below are the federal regulations on these valves:
§ 192.615 Emergency plans.
(a) Each operator shall establish written procedures to minimize the hazard resulting from a gas
pipeline emergency. At a minimum, the procedures must provide for the following:
(6) Emergency shutdown and pressure reduction in any section of the operator’s pipeline system
necessary to minimize hazards to life or property.
§ 192.181 Distribution line valves.
(a) Each high-pressure distribution system must have valves spaced so as to reduce the time to shut down a section of main in an emergency. The valve spacing is determined by the operating pressure, the size of the mains, and the local physical conditions.
(b) Each regulator station controlling the flow or pressure of gas in a distribution system must have a valve installed on the inlet piping at a distance from the regulator station sufficient to permit the operation of the valve during an emergency that might preclude access to the station.
(c) Each valve on a main installed for operating or emergency purposes must comply with the following:
(1) The valve must be placed in a readily accessible location so as to facilitate its operation in an emergency.
(2) The operating stem or mechanism must be readily accessible.
(3) If the valve is installed in a buried box or enclosure, the box or enclosure must be installed so as to avoid transmitting external loads to the main.
Your state regulations (PSC) go further with a maximum re-light time for any “critical valve” shutdown of 8 hours.
The problem most companies run into since many do not maintain un-regulated main valves at each city block, is they only have ready access to the “critical valves” in the case of a main leak/break! The other issue here is, unlike un-regulated main valves that may shut down a handful of gas customers when closed, “critical valves” have potentially hundreds or even thousands of customers reliant on gas the “critical valve” would cut off if it was shut down in an emergency.
This creates a costly relight policy for the gas company, and a reportable incident to regulators. This is the reason for the continued reluctance, almost refusal to shut these valves down when you have a serious and uncontrolled gas leak.
If you read the regulations above, They clearly state what these valves are for…”emergency shutdown” designed to prevent an explosion.
The url you read where it said “NEVER shut them down” is likely a company position (maybe even a regulator?). But does not comply with the regulations themselves.
They NEVER shut them down because of all the work it will create since there are too many customers per maintained main valve.
Hope that helps clear up any confusion?
Mark
Great stuff, Mark…This helps show why MGE might have been reluctant to shut off the critical or primary valve. The paragraph about the relight policy and a shutoff being reportable to regulators is particularly enlightening: Gas company officials have to think long and hard before ordering a shutoff.
MORE REASON THAN EVER THAT THE FIRE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE MAKING THOSE CALLS…In my opinion, MGE SUCKS!
BTW–with regard to cash being a factor.
My experience with “Recurring Revenue” companies is similar to this–
“Money is always a factor when corporations increase profits by reducing investment in critical safety systems.
Properly training personnel, installing critical safety equipment (such as shutoff valves), having the personnel present to PROPERLY RESPOND TO EMERGENCIES in a timely fashion, and maintenance and testing of existing safety systems; all are cost centers, not profit centers.”
I believe that Time Warner, like all bandwidth companies greases the wheel that squeaks. If enough customers complaing about “Digitizing” then the bandwidth company buys some more T1s or DS3s to keep the customers from storming the castle during a Chiefs game. They deny this and use technical nomenclature to obfuscate and confuse the issue, but, in the end, “Recurring Revenue” comapnies are about one thing, reducing the ongoing cost of their product.
Now that is true with all companies, but the categorical straight line reference and laser like effect of cost reduction in “Recurring Revenue” companies, which have a set number of customers (In gnereal) gas, electricity, bandwidth et al, can be seen very quickly in these same companies.
There is some irony, with one “Recurring Revenue” company, in conjunction with another “Recurring Revenue” comapany creating this tragedy.
JMO.
Where did the quote come from, Chuck? Don’t forget your footnotes, or Professor Fitz will have to flunk ya!
(You’re not the only violator, though. I had to Google the first few words of “MBAs” interesting history of MGE to find out he lifted it from Wikipedia…I added the citation for him, but he’s on my academic watch list, too.)
(Sheepish grin)
Thanks for fixing my omission. Embarrassing to commit that violation on my first visit.. I didn’t know whether to post a hotlink, or the url as a hotlink or just the url in plain text; and then forgot to cite. Do you have a policy or preference for how to post links or citations? Will posting a link always send a comment to moderation?
It’s unthinkable to put a utility or private company in charge of routine or non-routine emergencies. The KCFD and KCPD are charged with protecting the public. They can look to a utility or private company for technical advice but NOT to be in charge of protecting the public.
Think about it — would a manager or mid-level or high-level manager at a utility make a decision to evacuate a city block to err on the side of caution? No way. Odds are they would be very averse to the adverse public relations fallout and the potentially career-limiting move, if an explosion didn’t occur.
Utilities and private companies do not have public safety as their number one objective. They obviously have an interest in public safety, but their interest is counterbalanced by the self-interest they have as semi-public or private entities.
Dave Helling reported on Feb. 23r: “The plan (Kansas City’s emergency response plan), first adopted in 2006, empowers ‘incident commanders’ from the fire or police departments to make the evacuation call during routine emergencies, including ‘minor threats from explosions.’ Private workers aren’t mentioned.”
It’s crystal clear that evacuation should have been called for by the KCFD and by MGE.
The Mayor said, on behalf of the city, “We don’t do gas.”
I would like to respectfully chalk that comment up to a random contemporaneous remark, the kind we all make from time to time.
What the Mayor probably meant was…“Kansas City’s first responders, especially the KCFD and KCPD, are charged with making evacuation calls during routine and non-routine emergencies, including minor threats from explosions, assuming the worst probable scenario. And we take that responsibility very seriously.”
And he probably meant to add, “And yes, we’re going to play the blame game to prevent future deaths and public harm.”
Perfect, Greg…I’ve been trying for a week now to properly express how clear it is that the police and fire departments are the public’s front line of protection. By far..no other agency or entity coming close…And you hit it perfectly when you talked about the counterbalancing that is at play with utilities and private companies.
Oh, yes, the mayor…Like you, I’m sure the amended statements you put in his mouth were those that he meant to make, because he couldn’t possibly have been thinking about anything other than public safety in the aftermath of JJ’s…could he?
Thanks Mark! Appreciate the info and it explains why I was confused on the “Main Valve” issue.
The regs I quoted, were indeed from a St. Louis Gas Company Website.
Thanks again!
:)
To MBA’s: Links should work fine, and, no, I don’t think that will automatically send a comment to moderation, but I’ll watch and see…I don’t have a particular citation policy, just want commenters to let us know, somewhere, when and from where they’re picking up unoriginal passages.
Having posted a couple of comments, you should not run into the moderation speed bump from now on…although that does pop up occasionally, for some reason.
The lawyers are establishing accepted precedent (Which doesn’t follow regulations) in protocols between MGE and the City. At this point, after reading this article–
http://www.kansascity.com/2013/02/27/4089789/contractor-applied-for-permit.html
and watching the TV News, it looks like enought to confuse jurors as to the actual responsibility.
Yesterday, Channel 5 interviewed a different Gas company that stated indeed, that the procedure was to file for a permit (Which MGE did.) and then proceed if there was no word back from the City (The TV station did not get a specific on the amount of time considered acceptable when waiting to begin if there was no word back.).
The 911 calls were interesting.
There was no panic, no worry in the voice of the guys who hit the line.
Kind of an every day problem thing to hit a line?